Sino-Indian War
The Sino-Indian war was fought in 1962 between China and India.
The following information is courtesy of the Field Marshal Military Web Project.
Introduction
On October 16, 1962, eleven years after it had invaded Tibet, the Peoples Republic of China assailed Himalayan India in a surprise attack that ended millennia of peaceful co-existence between the two Asian giants. As a result, approximately 43,000 square kilometers of Indian territory is still under occupation by the PRC.
Though an often overlooked conflict the 1962 Sino-Indian war is very significant because its historical ramifications can be strongly felt today. Not only did it alter the course of the Cold War, but became the primary cause of consternation between two of the largest countries, economies, militaries, and civilizations of the world - India and China. It is a conflict that, today, directly involves one third of humanity.
Background into the Conflict
Every war can be traced back to its roots deep in the annals of history; wars do not come up out of the blue, rather they are the result of a sequence of slow, grinding steps that inevitably lead to the conclusion as battle. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 is no exception: its roots can be traced back to the Chinese annexation of Tibet wherein the first seeds of war were sown.
After Indian independance in 1947, India had maintained missions in Lhasa and Gyangtse. Due to the close relations that existed between India and Tibet - going back centuries beyond the British trade treaties - and also because of the unsettled conditions of a China enwrapped in a bitter civil war, Tibet’s transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly through India. Well into 1950, Tibet was regarded as a free country. Indeed, China also had a mission in Lhasa, underlining the fact that Tibet was nominally independant.
On July 8, 1949, following the defeat of Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Government in the Chinese civil war, the Tibetan Government asked the Chinese mission to "vacate", calling upon its rights as an independant country to request the expultion of diplomats. Tibetan records show that they had planned this expulsion of the Chinese agents for more than a year.
China invited Tibetans early in the 1950s to "accede peacefully" and backed up this emphatic plea by stationing an army near the city of Chamdo in East Tibet. An anxious Tibetan delegation hurriedly agreed to go to Peking to talk to the PRC themselves in an effort to defuse the sudden tension. On October 7, 1950, the day the Tibetan delegation was scheduled to arrive, 80,000 soldiers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China attacked Tibet and announced its 'peaceful liberation'. The Dalai Lama was forced to sign, under duress, the " 17-Point Agreement of May 23, 1951", surrendering to the Chinese attack. Imposed on the Tibetan government, the "Agreement", the PRC claims, shows that Tibetans not only agreed to, but actually invited Chinese Communist troops to "liberate" Tibet.
This action, and the systematic devastation of the Tibetan people and culture, naturally, took both Tibet and India completely by surprise. Nehru complained that he had been "led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet." The legality, or lack thereof, and account of the PRC's invasion of an independent Tibet, though entwined in history with the '62 war, will be omitted in this project.
The huge public outcry in India protesting the Chinese invasion mainly dealt with the political and cultural facets of this issue. Prior to Indian independence, the British had earmarked Tibet as a neutral buffer zone in view of British India's defense environment vis-à-vis the similar imperialistic leanings of China and Russia. Barring a few people with acute perception, most Indian politicians, along with the common man, failed to anticipate the strategic ramifications of the Chinese aggression and the loss of this buffer.
Pandit Jaharwalal Nehru, the Prime Minister of the newly independent India, following his foreign policy of trying to establish its mutual, nonaligned relations on the international scene, held the view that India could ill afford a confrontation over Tibet at a nascent point in India's history, and especially so during the ongoing Korean War. On November 18, 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Home Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, saying, "We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempt to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy."
Instead of taking an interest in the whole Tibet issue, which could be argued in retrospect to be of the most critical import to India, Nehru had instead shown a greater interest in the Korean War. Indeed, India' under Nehru's leadership, went to great lengths to insure and assure that friendship with China was the keystone of India's foreign policy, and that India along with China could mutually hold the non-aligned balance of power in Asia. While high-minded, this impractical view was to result in disastrous, unforeseen consequences for India.
Nehru's two closest advisors at the time were the socialist-leaning Krishna Menon and India's then Ambassador to China during the Communist Revolution, K. M. Panikkar. They were largely responsible for Nehru's decision to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Panikkar had strong Communist leanings - so much so that he successfully wished his daughter's marriage to a leading Communist labor leader. Panikkar, when called upon by Nehru, went so far as to fib that there was a "lack of confirmation" of the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and argued that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet would be an "interference to India’s efforts on behalf of China in the UN." It seems that Panikkar was more interested in protecting Chinese interests in the UN than India’s own interests on the Tibetan border. Amazingly Nehru concurred with his Ambassador. He wrote, "our primary consideration is maintenance of world peace... Recent developments in Korea have not strengthened China’s position, which will be further weakened by any aggressive action [by India] in Tibet." So Nehru was ready to sacrifice India’s national security interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China’s case in the UN! He also was unclear about how his "primary consideration" of maintaining world peace would be served by the Chinese invasion of an independant-recognized Tibet. Patel scathingly remarked that the Panikkar "has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions."
Sardar Patel, however, wanted a strong line to be adopted against the Chinese aggression. He wrote to Nehru that "even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as friends." India moreover had international support to this matter, with world opinion strongly against Chinese aggression in Tibet. The world, in fact, was looking to India to take the lead. The highly influential English publication The Economist echoed the Western viewpoint when it wrote: "Having maintained complete independence of China since 1912, Tibet has a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. But it is for India to take a lead in this matter. If India decides to support independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China, Britain and U.S.A. will do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition to it." It was a testament to Patel's vision that his prophecies of increasingly aggressive China, evident from his letters to Nehru at the time, were to be unfortunately proven correct in a decade's time. Sadly, instead of hardening its attitude towards China, India supplied 10,000 maunds of rice to Tibet under China, a year after its occupation, following reports of famine there. China made the demand to this effect and India obliged.
It would be instructive to examine the Chinese claims on Tibet in brief at this juncture, since the dispute over the "McMahon Line" that demarcated the border between India and China owes its origins to these claims. The ostensible reason given by China when the PLA entered Tibet was to "liberate three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression, to complete the unification of the whole of China, and to safeguard the frontier regions of the country". Cutting through the propaganda reveals the underlying truth in this statement - the safeguarding of China by proactive engagement; in the 'engagee' in this case being the Kingdom of Tibet. It is generally surmised that the reason behind China's invasion was to gain control of the highly strategic crossroads of Tibet that lead to the heart of Western, Central, South and South East Asia, and can be used as a springboard for engaging the same.
In 1842, the autonomous Tibetans and the Dogra rulers of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir signed a non-aggression pact on respecting the "old, established frontiers." The boundary was not specified. To clarify this, in 1847 the British delineated a boundary from the Spiti river up to the Pangong lake. The area further north up to the Karakoram Pass was left out. The first boundary alignment here was recorded in 1865 when W. H. Johnson of the Survey of India trekked across the Aksai Chin and drew a map including this in Jammu and Kashmir. Johnson was soon appointed Kashmir's commissioner in Ladakh. The Foreign Office came to be of the view that the border should be pushed further to the Kuen Lun range to absorb Aksai Chin and to put a British controlled buffer in between to forestall the presumed Russian advance, as the British did with Afghanistan, though nothing came of this.
In 1892 the Chinese put a boundary marker at the Karakoram Pass and told the British officer and adventurer, Capt. Young, that Chinese territory began there and that the boundary ran along the Karakoram range. The reasons given for this was that Askai Chin is an "integral" and "sacred" part of Tibet, which the Chinese claim. In 1998, Chinese ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, quoted verbatim the Chinese government statement given to the British on this matter when he stated that "there exists no issue of China's evacuation from Aksai Chin because Aksai Chin has been China's territory since ancient times and ever since under the effective administration jurisdiction of China." Sadly, the claim has no credible historical, or legal, backing; while Tibet has always had varying degrees of freedom historically, and at various times it was autonomous, at other times it was integrated into a larger China, or allied with Indian kingdoms. Indeed, Tibet was also a tributary to the Mughal Empire in the subcontinent. Regardless, it was noted by both the British and the Chinese, even then, that the boundary marker could not be regarded as having any legal value in international law because the boundary was not demarcated jointly.
In 1904, a British military expedition was sent to China under the leadership of Colonel Young to prevent China from falling under the influence of "foreign" powers. An Anglo-Tibetan treaty was signed with China that granted Britain trading rights and marked the origin of direct British influence in and of Tibet. An Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1906 followed up the previous treaty. Treaties not withstanding, the Chinese tried to capture Tibet many times until 1913, but failed to make headway against the British. In 1913, Tibet declared independence, and a conference was held in 1914 in Simla regarding Tibetan independence.
The Simla Conference was agreed to be a tripartite one, in which the Tibetans were an equal partner in the talks with the Chinese and British. Legalities of the Tibetan independence notwithstanding, this casts much doubt on the nature of Chinese position that states Tibet was merely a Chinese province. Tibet demanded recognition of their de facto sovereignty - a proposal intolerable to the Chinese, as China did not wish to give up their claim to Tibet, though they did not actually control it. It was decided that Tibet was to be divided into an Inner- and an Outer-Tibet. Eventually it was agreed that Outer-Tibet would accept Chinese "suzerainty" if its autonomous status were recognized, but in the end China refused to sign the treaty because of disagreements over the China-"inner Tibet" border - not the Tibet-India border - based on vague and ephemeral "historical boundaries."
When this happened, China lost the opportunity to be recognized as suzerain over Tibet in international law. Tibet was at the time functionally independent, as its government's participation in the border talks shows, and by no treaty had it agreed to accept Chinese suzerainty. In the end, the only legally binding outcome of the 1914 conference was that Britain and Tibet, represented by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra respectively, reached an agreement of a border settlement binding between themselves, bringing McMahon Line into being. To this meeting, the Chinese delegate was not invited, as the McMahon line was the agreement on the official demarcation of the border between Tibet and India; this highlights the fact that all the parties -China included- recognized that Tibet had full authority to negotiate its boundary with India. It is of crucial importance to note that the McMahon line legally had nothing to do with China.
To this date, the Chinese claim to the Indian areas is based upon the non-recognition of the McMahon Line, regardless of the recognition of Tibetan autonomy and Tibet's acceptance of the McMahon Line, which is is based on their illegal claim to Tibet. Seizing the opportunity to expand in the late 50s, they played upon quirky logic that would've been legally binding had Tibet been legally been part of China:
The first, (again, assuming Tibet is legally Chinese) is that the Tibetans, as a province of China, could not legally be signatories to the Simla Convention. Though the understood agreement that a Tibetan delegate was present, and the fact that Chou Enlai himself assured Nehru of Tibetan autonomy when the Chinese Prime Minister visited India in 1954. Also, the Chinese were never actual signatories to the Simla Convention, which was agreed to between the Tibetans and the British. Because a unilateral (solely British, since the Tibetan signature is not legally binding) agreement on a border demarcation is not valid, the whole McMahon line demarcation, which India inherited, comes into question.
Had these historical facts been put proactively forward by the Indian government in during the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, rather than dismissed out of apprehension of the geo-political situation, the world would have been appraised of the situation and the Indian locus stand would have been strengthened. Instead Mr. Nehru preferred a policy of appeasement and surrender to China and accepted this mammoth change in status quo. Regardless of vehement public outcry and hurt, the Indian government went so far as opposing the discussion of Tibet's appeal to the UN General Assembly of 23rd Nov 1950. Thus, the prescient in policy established was to cultivate Chinese friendship by buying it off. As events were to prove later, this was a most disastrous road to take. Nehru had failed to take into account that China had always tried to expand its territories at the expense of its neighbors, and a time would come when "Indian territory would have to be defended against the Chinese dragon."
Thus, the territories that came in dispute between India and China due to Chinese claims to Tibet are listed as follows:
1. The Eastern sector: 90,000 Sq. Km under Indian control then called the North-East Frontier Agency, or NEFA. 2. The Middle sector: 20,000 Sq. Km on either side of the Himalayan watershed and passes. 3. The Western sector: 30,000 Sq. Km of high plateau country known as the Aksai Chin in the district of Ladakh of Jammu and Kashmir state bordering Tibet and Xinjiang province of China.
Forward Posts Policy
Due to the increasing frequency of border incidents with the Chinese, it was felt by the Indian leadership that a proper response had to be given.
On 2 November 1961, a meeting was held at Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's house that was attended by, among others, Krishna Menon (Defence Minister), Lt. General Thapar (Chief of Army Staff), Lt. General Kaul (Quarter Master General), Brigadier Palit and O. Pulla Reddy (Defense secretary) to discuss the "China issue", and to come up with a pragmatic plan as to what response is appropriate. It was decided, that since China was still a "friend", it cannot be too drastic, but must show Indian resolve.
The outcome of the meeting would prove to be one of the turning points in the Sino-Indian conflict and amongst the most controversial pre-war decisions. It was decided that:
1. In Ladakh sector, in the IA would patrol as far forward as possible from the present Indian position towards the international border. Posts would be established on the border of Indian territory in an attempt to prevent further Chinese excursions.
2. The same would also apply to areas in Uttar Pradesh on the Indo-China border where posts would be established as far as possible in Indian territory.
The Ministry of External Affairs and the Intelligence Bureau had reasoned that this Indian activity would not elicit a major reaction from the Chinese. As it unfortunately turned out, this assessment would prove to be incorrect. In addition to this fundamental misconception the Indian Army, as will be detailed later, was not geared up for the above task to establish posts in a forward area that it could not support logistically or tactically. Gen. Thapar pointed out that the Chinese could never be matched in numbers and resources in the region since they had a well developed network for re-supply and reinforcement whereas India had a relatively underdeveloped infrastructure. His objections were met with assurances from Nehru and Menon that they did not expect any major escalation. The new orders were transmitted to the Eastern and Western commands on 5 December 1961. The whole exercise was given the codenamed "Operation ONKAR".
In October 1958, Lt. General S.P.P. Thorat, General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command had laid out a detailed paper regarding the defense of NEFA. He had realized that mere patrolling or establishing posts could never defend the McMahon line. Instead, he proposed a front line of forward posts on the border that was supported by two layers of military strongholds. The forward posts were to act merely as early warning beacons and symbols of territorial possession, and were not to be regarded as defended positions. The second line consisted of more strongly defended posts designed to slow down the advancing Chinese and to increase their logistical layout. The last line would actually stop the Chinese and from their counterattacks would be launched with the help of reinforcements from the plains.
Thus, it is clear that sound tactical thinking existed in the Indian Army but the militarily sound advice was largely ignored by the political leadership for short-term solutions and display of bravado.
State of the Indian Army prior to 1962: When the IA was ordered into NEFA in closing stages of 1959, it was faced with a deployment without adequate regional roads and infrastructure in this, one of the highest battlefields in the world. Almost all the posts in the forward and even some in the rear were supported by airlifts. Nearly everything had to be air dropped, right down to the daily rations, but due to the severe terrain, it was later estimated that only thirty percent of supplies dropped were recovered.
The rations provided to the troops had a calorific value suited for warfare on the plains rather then the high-calorie diet that is required for mountain warfare. Lentils, which are the staple food of the Indian "Jawan" soldier, could not be cooked at high altitudes. Pressure cookers, though requested were unavailable due to "administrative delays". Oil cookers, essential for keeping warm and cooking, were also in short supply.
Since the troops were widely dispersed without connecting roads, medical facilities were poor. Even the helicopters used for airlifts, recently purchased from Russia, were inadequate for high-altitude operations, and there was a marked shortage of spare parts. Winter clothing, and sometimes even basic clothing, was unavailable. New recruits rarely had the full list of items that were supposed to be issued to them. The army had no means of carrying heavy loads in the mountains and hence its mobility and firepower was severely reduced. Its main means of transport in the era of jets were mules and human porters.
The state of weapons and the training of the "jawans" (soldiers) were inadequate for the terrain they were on and the foes they faced. Almost all the equipment and weapons were of 1950s vintage. For instance, the standard infantry rifle issued was the Lee Enfield .303, dating back to W.W.II. Also, when the 4th Indian Division was deployed, it was not trained nor acclimatized for high altitude warfare. Most of its heavy equipment had to be left in the plains because of the lack of transportation. Thus they had precious little firepower they could call on if need be.
The already grave situation was made worse by a personal feud between the then Finance Minister Morarji Desai and the Defense Minister Krishna Menon. This had resulted in an obstructive finance ministry that did not allow the release of essential foreign exchange to buy what little equipment that had been sanctioned. Consequently, the Army's equipment was allowed to become obsolete. Desai claimed that supplies were deliberately withheld from Indian troops in the affected areas. There was considerable unhappiness about this in the Army, both at this and against Menon in general. Because of the playing off of different sections of the military as a result of political manovering and infighting, along with the supply crisis, morale was very low. Menon went to Ladakh personally in 1960 to appease dissent.
Think tanks at the time were at a general consensus that, to counter the Chinese threat, India should do three things:
1. Increase the number of, infrastructure supporting and supplies given to troops, 2. Station of sufficient mobile armored troops at strategic points on the plain to check any potential Chinese advance, whilst keeping an eye on Pakistan. 3. Train and arm sufficient numbers of Tibetan and other ethnic guerrilla groups to tie down significant numbers of Chinese troops behind the front lines, hampering transfer of troop, communication, and materiel. It was said that "the principal problem seems to be lack of interest on the part of the present Indian Government" to enact these suggestions.
The combination of ill-supply, ill-preparedness, numerical and technological inferiority and the heavy-handed decisions taken by a government with little care for ground realities of the impending conflict coalesced to certain the failure of the Indian Army against the Chinese. The training and professionalism of the Indian Jawan could not make up for the tremendous odds stacked against them.
Conflict Begins
The establishment of posts in the forward areas without adequate military support had created a situation that was ripe for a military disaster. On 8 September 1962, Brig. Dalvi, Commander, 7th Brigade received a message from his adjutant that around 8 am, about 600 Chinese soldiers had crossed Thagla Ridge and had surrounded the Dhola post. The post commander had requested immediate reinforcements. The Chinese had chosen the spot and the timing well: Thagla Ridge, which overlooked the key Chinese garrison at Leh, was an exceedingly remote area with terrain that was not conducive for troop movement. In addition, it was a Saturday and it would take a long time for the information to reach Delhi along the chain of command. India's chain of command was further drawn out and complicated by Nehru's attendance of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Nehru immediately flew back to India and was asked about his reaction. His cautious reply was, "Our instructions are to free our territory. I cannot fix a date; that is entirely for the Army to decide." It was magnified and reported by some members of the press into, "We shall throw the Chinese out." This misquoting is one of the biggest misconceptions that many hold about the '62 war. Meanwhile, a conference was held with GoC, 4th Division Gen. Niranjan Prasad presiding and it was decided that:
1. The Dhola post commander would be ordered to stay put, without withdrawal. The Assam Rifles wing at Lumla, which was two days march away, would be ordered to establish contact with Dhola. 2. The detachments of 9 Punjab at Shakti and Lumpu would move to Dhola while the ones at Towang would move to Lumpu. Dalvi knew that Towang, along with Tsangdhar and Hathungla, were vital positions that had to be defended at all costs. Any diversion of 9 Punjab to Dhola would leave Towang defenseless.
There were no plans to cater for a major clash at Towang if one should occur. Also, the route from Towang to Thagla was fit only for man pack columns, making troop movement difficult. A sound move would have been to abandon Thagla Ridge and concentrate on defending Towang. However, under political pressure from Brigadier General Staff at XXXIII Corps HQ, 9 Punjab was ordered to depart for Lumpu. Thus began Operation Leghorn with the limited aim of persuading the Chinese to leave Indian territory. The haphazard manner in which 9 Punjab was dispatched exposed the sad fact that Army HQ had no strategic plan in place to deal with a major Chinese response to the Forward Posts policy. Had Nehru not specifically ordered the military to not construct responses to this scenario, again, disaster may have been averted.
On 12th September, a meeting was held between Gen. L. P. Sen (Commander, Eastern theater), Gen. Umrao Singh and Gen. Niranjan Prasad. at Tezpur. Gen. Sen reiterated New Delhi's decision to "expel" the Chinese from Indian territory. Unfortunately, this was far removed from the ground situation. Gen. Umrao Singh correctly pointed out that the Chinese could quickly build up to Divisional strength and easily outbid any Indian reinforcements in the Thagla area. Furthermore, all Indian supply trips to areas around Dhola would have to be by airdrops, while the Chinese roadhead was a few miles behind Thagla Ridge. Umrao Singh suggested that Dhola post should be withdrawn 3 miles to the south to the original map marked boundary, and that, moreover, sending 7 Brigade to Thagla would expose Towang and make defense of Nagaland and Manipur more onerous. Unfortunately, Army HQ ignored this sound military advice, due to political, rather than strategic, pressure. This would contribute to the tragic events leading it the defeat of 26th October - purely due to political expediency of pandering Indian security for long-winded, and, in retrospect, empty, Chinese claims of good faith. The Chinese resorted to their previous methods adopted in Longju and Khenzemane. The Namka Chu, a fast moving riverlet with 4 bridges crossing it, had now become the de-facto military boundary, and later, the front. All 9 Punjab could do at this point was to dig in opposite the Chinese to prevent further incursion into Indian territory. 9 Punjab was pinned down opposite to Chinese posts and could not mount an attack due to the Chinese being on higher ground with clear lines of fire. In addition, any attack by 9 Punjab without proper bridging equipment, which they did not have, would have been suicidal due to constant Chinese monitoring.
9 Punjab finally managed to reach Dhola on the morning of 15th September and found Chinese troops on both sides of the Namka Chu river. The Chinese had control of the whole of the Thagla Ridge area, and when challenged, demanded that the Indians withdraw as the PRC decided to demarcate it "sacred Chinese land." The Chinese troops met were not mere Frontier guards, as was expected, but well armed troops with automatic weapons - the warmaking divisions of the PRC.
On 17th September, COAS HQ ordered 9 Punjab to "capture" Thagla Ridge. Brigadier Dalvi, the only senior commander in the area, refused to execute the order given the ground situation and asked for it to be countermanded. Meanwhile, in New Delhi the public was being assured that "the Army has been told to drive away the Chinese from our territory in NEFA", a task to which the IA was in no position to do. Dalvi realized that the Dhola had become militarily indefensible, as well as Hathungla and Karpola, given the current troop strengths, and advised HQ to abandon the posts. However, by now, Dhola had become a prestige issue with the political leadership and the army was ordered to retain the post.
On 20th September, a Chinese sentry near Bridge II on Namka Chu threw a grenade on the Indian position whereupon both sides opened fire. In the resultant shoot-out, 4 Chinese sentries were killed while there were 5 Indian casualties. The situation thus had escalated to a full-fledged shooting match. Meanwhile Eastern Command HQ and XXIII Corps finally managed to supply reinforcements and shore up 7 Brigade by rushing 1/9 Gorkhas and 2 Rajputs by 26th September. Stocking of supplies for 9 Punjab and the other regiments began belatedly but efforts were hampered due to severe lack of available portage. On the on the opening day of the war, October 20, 1962, 513 soldiers, 282 Jawans and officers died.
Leadership Change
At this point it would be interesting to note that the PM, the DM and the FM were abroad, and had not deemed the NEFA situation warranted an early return. In their absence, the officiating DM, Mr. Raghunath, held a meeting to discuss the Thagla situation with Gen. Sen. It was decided that:
a. The Chinese were to be evicted from the North bank of Namka Chu b. Thagla Ridge was to be contained c. Tsangle was to be patrolled.
Note that these were the exact same objectives and orders that were issued earlier to Brig. Dalvi and were later countermanded. Gen. Sen ordered Gen. Umrao Singh to come up with an operational plan to meet the above objectives. (Gen. Umrao Singh, as is pointed out earlier, had consistently resisted Operation Leghorn.) Gen. Umrao Singh passed the assignment to Brig. Prasad who in turn passed it to Brig. Dalvi. The Appreciation prepared by Brig. Dalvi attempted to show how unrealistic Operation Leghorn was. The envisaged operation would require supplies and equipment in amounts far beyond what airdrops and porters could deliver prior to the onset of winter. Moreover, this was assuming that the Chinese strength would remain constant at one battalion.
The plan called for a limited flanking movement from Bridge V at western edge of the valley. This move was to be in 3 stages: Lumpu to Tsangdhar via Karpola, Tsangdhar to Muskar and then to Tseng Jong. When Gen. Umrao Singh saw this draft, he was not satisfied, stating that it was too optimistic, but forwarded it to Gen. Sen with his adverse comments. Gen. Sen overruled Umrao and ordered Dalvi to go ahead with the plan. However, this brought the Umrao-Sen conflict to criticality. Sen met the defense minister and asked for permission to remove Gen. Umrao from GOC XXXIII Corps. Krishna Menon agreed and on 3rd October it was decided that Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul (on leave at that time) would replace Umrao Singh.
Clash at Tseng Jong
Lt. Gen. B. M. Kaul arrived in Tezpur on 4 October to take over the NEFA operations. He moved to Lumpu on the 5th, and, on learning that 2 battalions of 7 Brigade were still there, ordered 1/9 Gorkha and 2 Rajput to move onto Tsangdhar. Both battalions were under strength and did not have the requisite supplies or portage. The troops moved out in cotton uniforms with fifty rounds and light weapons leaving other equipment behind for heights of 14,500 and 16,000 feet. Deaths resulted due to lack of acclimatization. In spite of operational difficulties, Kaul still planned on the 10 October date laid down by Sen to complete Operation Leghorn. Kaul planned to place a battalion on Thagla Ridge itself across the Namka Chu river. The task was to be undertaken by 2 Rajputs. When it was pointed out that they had absolutely no artillery cover and summer clothing for 16000 feet, Kaul replied that "determined infantry do not need artillery" and that 6,000 sets of clothing would be arriving "soon" via airdrop. Meanwhile at Tsangdhar, the place scheduled for airdrop, the bulk of the airdrops was getting lost due to supplies landing in inaccessible places. There were only 3 days rations available to 1/9 Gorkhas and 2 Rajputs with both battalions spending the nights in summer clothing and one blanket per man.
Finally it was decided to send a patrol rather than commit a whole battalion. The patrol of 9 Punjab under Major Chaudhary consisted of 50 men. It reached Tseng Jong on the 9th of October. At 5 am of October 10th, about 800 Chinese troops supported by heavy mortars attacked 9 Punjab. The Punjabis were outnumbered, yet fought gallantly and repulsed the first Chinese assault inflicting heavy casualties. The Punjabis had 6 dead and 11 wounded and asked Brig. Dalvi permission to withdraw. Dalvi requested Kaul to hold further implementation of Leghorn in abeyance in view of the gravity of the situation. Inexplicably, Kaul replied that he had no authority to pull back from Thagla and decided to go to Delhi to talk with The PM Nehru.
The battle at Tseng Jong was now raging furiously. Major Chaudhary was wounded and made an appeal for mortar and machine gun fire to extricate his force. Brig. Dalvi, who was watching the battle, made the decision not to open up with his mortars and machine guns: Firstly, Tseng Jong was beyond his range of weapons. Secondly, it would have ignited the entire 12-mile front in an all-out battle. The Rajputs and Gorkhas who had been advancing to Tseng Jong as ordered earlier would have been mowed down by the Chinese machine guns across the Namka Chu. Moreover, Dalvi could not have sustained a firefight for long: he had two 3-inch mortars with 60 rounds each and 2 machine guns with 12000 rounds. That would have barely sufficed for half an hour. In addition, Lt. Gen. Kaul was moving to Delhi via a route that was parallel to the Chinese positions along the Namka Chu. An all out attack by the Chinese who were in division strength would have jeopardized Kaul's chances of reaching Delhi. Dalvi, then gave the Punjabis the order to fall back to Bridge IV.
Virtually defenseless, and committed against fully supported, fully entrenched, and a fully outnumbering enemy, the Indians fought most valiantly, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers. Surprisingly, the Chinese allowed the casualties to reach Indian lines. Some time later, the Chinese were found burying the Indian dead with full military honors, a testament to the professionalism of both sides. And due to political ineptness, a defenseless India found herself at the defending side of an incresingly hostile conflict.
The Chinese Attack
Kaul reached Delhi on 11th October and immediately met the Prime Minister to apprise him of the latest developments at Thagla. According to Kaul, he explained at the conference attended by the Defense Minister, Finance Minister and the three chiefs about the tactical unsoundness of the Indian position. Yet he offered 3 choices at the meeting:
a. Launch an attack despite the overwhelming Chinese superiority. b. Cancel the orders of attack and hold on to present positions. c. Withdraw to a more advantageous position.
Gen. Sen opined that 7 Brigade would hold against the Chinese and recommended that it remain in the current position. He was backed by Thapar and Kaul on this.
Meanwhile at Thagla, 7 Brigade was reinforced by 4 Grenadiers, who had arrived from Delhi only a few weeks prior and were in summer clothing with three days rations and fifty rounds of ammunition per rifle, bringing the total to 2,500 men. By 16th October they were further reinforced by 450 Border Roads Pioneers assist in carrying loads and collecting airdrops. Interestingly, 7 Brigade which normally could defend a linear defense of 300 yards was now tasked by Army HQ to defend 12000 yards without artillery cover to break up enemy attacks. Efforts were made to build up 7 Brigade in this regard by increasing the tempo of airdrops between 15th and 19th October. Paradoxically, as the tempo of airdrops increased, the amount actually collected decreased. Between 17th and 19th October the Chinese were seen steadily building up using their 7-ton road at Marmang. On 18th October, the Chinese marking parties were seen moving to forming-up places for a night advance and a dawn attack. Frantic messages were sent by & Brigade to Army HQ in this regard, but no decision was taken.
Predictably, on the morning of 20th October, the Chinese attacked with an artillery bombardment of 76 mm and 120 mm mortars at the Indian positions of Bridge III and Bridge IV. Massive infantry assaults followed in divisional strength. The Rajput and Gorkha positions in Dhola area were attacked with 2 brigades. One brigade advanced on Tsangdhar. Other columns were sent to Hathungla to prevent Indian forces from retreating via Bridges I and II while others threatened the divisional HQ at Ziminthaung. The Rajputs and Gorkhas were completely encircled and cut off from each other. They held on for over three hours despite lack of artillery support and reinforcements. Many platoons were to fight till the last man against overwhelming odds.
Major B. K. Pant, commander 2 Rajputs, was a fine example in courage displayed by the Indian soldier in the battle. His company held fast against three waves of Chinese assaults and had suffered heavy casualties. Pant himself was wounded in the stomach and legs. Yet he continued to lead and inspire his men, exhorting them to fight till the end to the last man. The Chinese sensing that their obstacle in taking 2 Rajputs lay with Major Pant, brought a volley of machine gun fire on his position killing him instantly. His last words were "Men of the Rajput Regiment, you were born to die for your country. God has selected this small river for which you must die. Stand up and fight like true Rajputs." He died proudly shouting the Rajput battle-cry: "Bajrang Bali ki Jai."
By 9 am, the Chinese had completely wiped out the two regiments of the Rajputs and the Gorkhas. 2 Rajputs alone had 282 killed, 81 wounded and captured and 90 unwounded and captured out of their total strength of 513. Brig. Dalvi, finding that 7 Brigade was being run over by the Chinese, tried to lead a small retreating party of Indian troops back to Indian lines but was taken prisoner at Dhola. As expected, the Indian posts at Tsangle were eliminated giving the Chinese control over the western end of NEFA. At the eastern edge of NEFA, fighting commenced near the Indian strongpoint of Walong. Also on 20 October, the Chinese attacked the forward posts in Ladakh. The Galwan post fell within a few weeks as did other Chinese targets.
The Last Stand
When news of the events of 20 October reached New Delhi, the reaction was of shock, surprise and a sense of betrayal. Pandit Nehru felt that China had betrayed India and had forced an unwanted war on India instead of peaceful co-existence as espoused in Panchasheel. After the Namkachu debacle, Indian Army HQ tried to find reinforcements for dispatch to the NEFA front. It was clear that the threat from a grumbling Pakistan precluded large-scale transfers of divisions from the western border. Hence new divisions in NEFA were raised by pulling out battalions from all over the rest of India.
A strategic plan for NEFA was developed by Army HQ. It focused on the two great ridges in NEFA; one some distance behind the other. Se La, the key feature on the first ridge was to be vital ground backed up by another large garrison at Bomdilla on the second ridge, about 60 miles away. These two strongpoints would be built up to the requisite strength by stocking it up for a siege lasting 15-20 days. Even If the road between Se La and Bomdilla had to be abandoned to the Chinese, air drops would take over for both perimeters. It was also reasoned that the Chinese would be unable to sustain a siege for long due to their stretched lines of communications while the Indians would be supplied from the plains easily, and would have artillery and other heavy weapons at their disposal. This box or fortress defense strategy appealed to Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh who was Lt. Gen. Kaul's replacement, due to the latter falling ill at that time. It must be noted that the Thorat-Sen plan detailed earlier called for concentrating at Bomdilla. Militarily, concentrating at Bomdilla would have made sense, however, this idea was rejected as it would require handing over more territory to the Chinese. The government, in a political face-saving gesture, overlooked a fundamental rule of war, that the exchange of territory is acceptable to form a more strategic position whence victory can be achieved from potential defeat.
On 28th October, Kaul reassumed command of IV Corps from Harbaksh Singh. Immediately on assuming command Kaul visited Se La and Bomdilla. The Harbaksh Singh- Palit plan of building up Se La and Bomdilla was progressing well. Se La, under 62 Brigade, was manned by five battalions. Sixty miles down the road, Bomdilla was held by 48 Brigade with 3 battalions. Total strength in the area was around 10-12,000 men. In-between the two was Dirang Dzong, the administrative center. However, Kaul made some fundamental changes to the Harbaksh-Palit plan which would prove to be the final undoing of the Indian Army in NEFA. Kaul allowed the newly appointed GOC 4 Division Maj. Gen. A. S. Pathania to set up his HQ at Dirang Dzong rather than at Se La or Bomdilla. This resulted in only one brigade to defend Se La rather than the two envisaged in the Harbaksh-Palit plan. Se La, Bomdilla and Dirang Dzong could now no longer hold out independently of support by road. A great deal depended on keeping the 60-mile stretch between Se La and Bomdilla open.
On 16th November, the Chinese launched probing attacks on the northwest and northeast approaches at Se La. 62 Brigade at Se La put up a stiff resistance, however Pathania ordered them to fall back to Dirang Dzong. Hoshiar Singh, the commander of Se La wanted to hold out at Se La, however under orders a battalion was pulled back from a key prepared position on the Se La perimeter. It was told to occupy a point just behind and below the Se La pass to protect the retreat route. The sight of troops falling back demoralized the Se La defenders. Also, the Chinese who by then had encircled Se La moved into the vacated prepared positions and opened fire. Fighting became heavy and there was vicious hand-to-hand combat. As dawn broke, 62 Brigade was in full retreat from Se La. Again, the Indians inflicted heavy casualties on the superior enemy, giving approximately five times more than was received. The question that now remained was whether to make a stand at Direng Dzong or at Bomdilla. Again, Kaul made a critical mistake: instead of specifying instructions to Pathania on the course of action (since Lt. Gen. Kaul was directing the theater operations), he left this important decision at Pathania's discretion. Pathania opted for something else: 65 Brigade at Dirang Dzong was ordered to head for the Assam plains and not Bomdilla. Although the Chinese had opened light arms fire on Dirang Dzong HQ, only small enemy parties had reached its vicinity. Pathania had 3000 men of 65 Brigade under his command and could have put up a fight if he wanted. Yet he ordered a withdrawal from Dirang Dzong. In addition, a column of 65 Brigade with tanks, infantry and support troops left for Bomdilla, however it disintegrated on being ambushed by the Chinese on the road stretch. Bomdilla now remained the last Indian stronghold in NEFA. It was held by 48 Brigade under the command of Brig. Gurbaksh Singh. It would have proved to be a major obstacle for the Chinese, had it not been for Lt. Gen. Kaul who ordered several companies from Bomdilla to be moved out for road clearing operations.
On 18th November when the Chinese attacked, Bomdilla had only 6 companies in place of the intended 12. On the morning of 18th Nov., 48 Brigade was repulsing a Chinese attack in their prepared positions when Kaul phoned Gurbaksh Singh and asked for a column to be sent towards Direng Dzong. Gurbaksh Singh protested since that would mean pulling out troops form his defences and opening Bomdilla to the Chinese. Interestingly, at that time Pathania had already abandoned Direng Dzong and a relief column from Bomdilla would have served little purpose. Yet Kaul was insistent. Accordingly, at 11:15 am. two infantry companies, two of 48 Brigade's four tanks, two mountain guns were rounded up for Direng Dzong. No sooner had the column left Bomdilla, it was promptly ambushed by the Chinese hidden in the nearby wooded slopes. The Indian troops tried returning to their original positions, but these were already held by the Chinese. A full scale attack on the Bomdilla perimeter was now in progress.
After several hours of fighting, the Chinese managed to capture Indian bunkers in both forward and rear areas of the perimeter and pressurized one flank. Seeing that no reinforcements were forthcoming from the plains, Gurbaksh Singh at 4 p.m. decided to order a withdrawal from Bomdilla. He intended to regroup and fight at Rupa, 8 miles to the south. However, 48 Brigade's withdrawal was slow. Meanwhile, the requested reinforcements arrived at Bomdilla at 6:30 p.m. They were never told to the contrary even though Gurbaksh Singh had abandoned Bomdilla. Gurbaksh Singh again thought of defending Bomdilla, but by then the Chinese had cut his lines of communications. On November 19, 1962, Bomdilla fell at 3 am. The planned defence at Rupa never materialized and the remnants of 48 Brigade finally dissolved at Chaku, a position further south of Rupa on 20th November. All resistance by 4 Division had now ended.
The Chinese assault into had extended their line of communication and supplies much too far. Being unable to maintain it, they made a virtue of necessity and declared a unilateral cease-fire on October 24, 1962. While not withdrawing claim, they withdrew occupation to the pre-war boundaries north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but kept a Switzerland-sized area 38,000 Sq. Km of seized territory up to their Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh district. Further, Pakistan illegally gifted China with a 2,600 Sq. Km tribute of Jammu and Kashmir territory in 1963. The People's Republic of China also does not recognize the merger, initiated by Sikkimese popular vote, of Sikkim state and India.
The Aftermath
The 1962 Debacle, as it is remembered in India, was the inexorable ramification of a century-old British border dispute, thrust upon a newly independent India. When China reached a juncture whence it could act proactively to the sense of injustice about colonial actions against them, the result was an eruption of a xenophobic, aggressive imperialism.
There is a Chinese phrase oft quoted within the Chinese government: "If he strikes me once, it is his fault. If he strikes me again, it is my fault." The People's Republic of China seemed to have taken this mentality to heart, and in the effort to exorcise the demons of colonialism, have become imperialists themselves. Subverting various indigenous countries and areas in affirmation of vague "historical" citings had become a fundamental cornerstone of China's geo-strategic maneuvering in the '50s and '60s.
The Chinese claims to Aksai Chin and large areas of Arunachal are a mix of an expression of this neo-colonial sentiment and the desire to acquire a dominant status in Asia by keeping rival India in a weaker bargaining position. This is not saying that the PRC is necessarily "evil" in this respect, as many Indian journalists are prone to claim; it is simply geopolitics. What is unusual, however, is the rather unscrupulous means, even among the big-power nations, that the PRC has taken to reach this position. When China sought recognition of its claim on Tibet after its occupation, the Chinese leadership avidly cultivated India, and won the heart of a high-minded but naïve Prime Minister Nehru. "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" (India and China are brothers) became the soundbyte of the day - and the Chinese cannot be faulted in their execution of this deception. While the shells fell and the bullets flew around the Jawans in the snow-capped hell of the Himalayan battlefield, the Indian leaders in Delhi were romancing the fluffy pull of empathy with a fraternal Asian nation that, too, had suffered exploitation by the Western colonial powers.
Added to the chaos and the mounting of tensions after the border clashes and failed settlement talks in 1960, and arguably a prime factor in making the dispute a mutual national prestige issue, was the internal political flux within both India and China. India was democratic and, therefore, more sensitive to its public and parliamentary opinion, and highly politicized debates about the Chinese question raged across the Parliament floor and in stratified governmental agencies. In particular, the elected representatives of the various Communist parties in India were indignant by the notion that their fraternal socialist brethren would be capable of starting such a conflict, and laid the blame solely on the "capitalist-lackey" Nehru's shoulders. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the right-leaning parties blamed the crisis on a "socialist" Nehru's ignorance and non-recognition of the reality of situation. On the other side, a communist Peking did not have this intra-political problem, but it was engaged in intense ideological remolding and suffered from a sense of political isolation, aggravated by its increasing ideological differences with Russia since 1958, when the latter, for example, refused to give it a sample atom bomb. The '62 war highlighted several critical failures in India's warmaking abilities. First, and perhaps most significantly, the conflict highlighted political naïveté and ignorance toward the strategies of warfare and international relations. During the entire conflict, Indian diplomatic actions remained flaccid, and fluctuated between being confrontational to being manhandled. For example, intel told that the Chinese were building a road through Aksai Chin, yet the Government, apart from a few angry condemnations, chose to ignore the strategic significance of it for almost a decade, instead repeating to itself the mantra of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai. Even upon discovery of this transgression, India's protests were weak-kneed. Later, in the middle of 1962, Indian leaders suddenly woke up to the presence of Chinese soldiers, to the exasperation of much of the army, on the Thagla Ridge. Nehru, advised by Krishna Menon and a coterie of sycophantic generals, ordered a reckless operation on the attacking Chinese. In the adoption of a forward policy, against the clamoring of sound tacticians, India deployed on ground chosen for its political significance, rather than tactical defensibility. The leadership's untenable demands on the Army were the root cause of the '62 debacle.
The war also highlighted the fact that the army was acutely under-equipped, out-dated, and ill-trained to deal with sustained conflict in the Himalaya. The acclimatization of troops was of critical import in this mountain war. Though Indian kill ratios were vary favorable, the damage caused by non-acclimatization of troops, particularly in the eastern sector, compared to the troops in Ladakh, who were better equipped and acclimatized, is very evident.
The psychological and political effects of the '62 war were far-reaching. Because of the war, India's image, especially among the "Third World", the nations remaining non-aligned during the Cold War, suffered. But internally, the shock galvanized the people into one united nation. Krishna Menon resigned and Nehru's dream of Sino-Indian friendship was shattered, but India did not relinquish its independent policy of Non-Alignment, though a shadow was shed on India's position as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, statements by the PRC promoting the Chinese revolution as a model and Beijing's actions in the Taiwan Strait in 1958 and the 1962 Sino-Indian War alarmed many Third World nations. During the 1960s China cultivated ties with Third World countries and insurgent groups in an attempt to encourage "wars of national liberation" and revolution to forge an international united front against both the superpowers. Third World appreciation for Chinese assistance coexisted, consequently, with growing suspicions of China's militancy. These increasingly militant tendencies, contradictory to the much lauded "Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" soundbyte, destroyed what active influence the PRC had on the NAM. Discord between China and many Third World countries continued to grow, while relations India and the Soviet Union warmed to counter the decision by Pakistan to cavort to the Western Camp in an effort to counter Indian superiority and influence. The two most powerful nonaligned nations strayed further from their NAM policies, and thus the weakened NAM did not wield as much influence during the later part of the Cold War as it did during the beginning, and thus the era of a strictly bi-polar Cold War world was ushered in.
The Indian Army's defeat by the Chinese in the border war of 1962 was a national humiliation, but the nation reacted to the '62 war with an unprecedented surge of patriotism. The main lesson India learned was that right does not make might in the world of geopolitics, and that India must strengthen its defenses and stand on its own feet to be of consequence in the world. India's policy of weaponization via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. National sovereignty, it would affirmed, could not come at the expense of becoming a client state of any superpower or by joining any military alliance with or under them.
In the early '80s, following a new paradigm shift in the Indian military, it was decided that the Army was to actively patrol the Line of Actual Control. Friction began to ensue over the Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu pasturage, lying north of Tawang. The media, catching wind of the situation, gave it national prominence, and an angry exchange of official protests between the Indian and Chinese governments followed. Adding to the bickering, a bill was passed creating the state of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory that China claims in its entirety.
The military re-occupied Hathung La ridge, across Namka Chu, twenty-five years after vacating it. Army chief K. Sundarji airlifted an entire brigade to nearby Ximithang, alarming the panicked Chinese. The Indian government collectively flinched against the tough talk from Beijing, but stood firm at the insistence of the army. The result paradoxically was a thaw. In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian bilateral Peace and Tranquillity Accords, an agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group to determine where the LAC lies have taken place but the pace of progress has been tardy to say the least.